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Using individual-level data on homeowner debt and defaults from 1997 to 2008, we show that borrowing
against the increase in home equity by existing homeowners is responsible for a significant fraction
of both the sharp rise in U.S. household leverage from 2002 to 2006 and the increase in defaults from
2006 to 2008. Employing land topology-based housing supply elasticity as an instrument for house
price growth, we estimate that the average homeowner extracts 25 to 30 cents for every dollar increase
in home equity. Money extracted from increased home equity is not used to purchase new real estate
or pay down high credit card balances, which suggests that borrowed funds may be used for real outlays
(i.e., consumption or home improvement). Home equity-based borrowing is stronger for younger households,
households with low credit scores, and households with high initial credit card utilization rates. Homeowners
in high house price appreciation areas experience a relative decline in default rates from 2002 to 2006
as they borrow heavily against their home equity, but experience very high default rates from 2006
to 2008. Our estimates suggest that home equity-based borrowing is equal to 2.8% of GDP every year
from 2002 to 2006, and accounts for at least 34% of new defaults from 2006 to 2008.
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  U.S. household leverage sharply increased in the years preceding the current economic 
recession. The top panel of Figure 1 shows the steady rise in household debt since 1975, which 
sharply accelerated beginning in 2002. In just five years, the household sector doubled its debt 
balance. In comparison, the contemporaneous increase in corporate debt was modest. The middle 
panel shows that the increase in household debt from 2002 to 2007 translated into a striking rise 
in household leverage as measured by the debt to income ratio. During the same time period, 
corporate leverage declined. The dramatic absolute and relative rise in U.S. household leverage 
from 2002 to 2007 is unprecedented compared to the last 25 years. 
One reason for the rapid expansion in household leverage during this period was that 
mortgage credit became more easily available to new home buyers (Mian and Sufi (2009)). 
However, strong house price appreciation from 2002 to 2006, which may have been fueled by 
the availability of mortgage credit to a riskier set of new home buyers, could also have had an 
important feedback effect on household leverage through existing homeowners. 
Our central goal in this study is to investigate how existing homeowners respond to the 
rising value of their home equity, a channel we refer to as the home equity-based borrowing 
channel. This is an important question for several reasons. First, given that 65% of U.S. 
households already owned their primary residence before the acceleration in house prices 
beginning in the late 1990s, a strong home equity-based borrowing channel may be an important 
cause of the rapid rise in household leverage preceding the economic downturn. 
Second, the quantitative strength of the home equity-based borrowing channel is 
theoretically ambiguous. House price appreciation may have no effect on homeowner borrowing 
because the increase in home equity wealth is counter-balanced with a higher cost of future 
housing consumption (Sinai and Souleles (2005), Campbell and Cocco (2007)). On the other 
hand, if homeowners are credit-constrained or subject to self-control issues, then house price   2
appreciation may induce households to borrow more (Stein (1995), Ortalo-Magne´ and Rady 
(2006), Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2006), and Laibson (1997)). 
Third, to the extent that homeowners use home equity-based borrowing to finance real 
outlays such as consumption or home improvement, a large home equity-based borrowing 
channel could provide a quantitative explanation for the decline in the U.S. savings rate in the 
decade preceding the financial crisis. More broadly, if house prices strongly affect existing 
homeowners’ borrowing behavior, then dramatic swings in the housing market may have real 
effects on the economy through consumption and mortgage defaults. 
We examine the home equity-based borrowing channel using a data set consisting of 
anonymous individual credit files of a national consumer credit bureau agency. The agency has 
provided us a random sample of almost 70,000 homeowners living in every major metropolitan 
statistical area in the United States. We track these individuals at an annual frequency from the 
end of 1997 until the end of 2008. This data set allows us to separate homeowners borrowing 
against the rising value of their home equity from renters buying into a hot housing market. 
The bottom panel of Figure 1 plots the growth in debt of 1997 homeowners over time, 
and shows that existing homeowners borrow significantly more debt as their house prices 
appreciate from 2002 to 2006. While the aggregate trend is suggestive of a link, changes in house 
prices and homeowner borrowing may be jointly determined by an omitted variable such as a 
shock to expected income growth (King (1990), Attanasio and Weber (1994), Muellbauer and 
Murphy (1997)). As a result, proper identification of the effect of house prices on borrowing 
requires an exogenous source of variation in house price growth. 
We use two different instruments for house price growth, one based on across-MSA 
variation and another based on within-MSA variation. The across-MSA specification uses 
housing supply elasticity at the MSA level as an instrument for house prices. MSAs with elastic 
housing supply should experience only modest increase in house prices in response to large shifts   3
in the demand for housing because housing supply can be expanded relatively easily. In contrast, 
inelastic housing supply MSAs should experience large house price changes in response to the 
same housing demand shock (Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saiz (2008)).  
We confirm this relationship in our data using the land-topology based measure of 
housing supply elasticity introduced by Saiz (2008). Using this instrument, the across-MSA 
instrumental variables estimate uncovers a large home equity-based borrowing channel. Our 
preferred estimate suggests an elasticity of borrowing with respect to increased home equity of 
0.60. Alternatively, we find that households borrow 25 to 30 cents on each additional dollar of 
home equity from 2002 to 2006.  
An obvious concern with the IV estimates is that MSAs with an inelastic supply of 
housing could also experience differential non-house price-related credit demand shocks. A 
number of tests mitigate this concern however. First, the borrowing patterns in elastic and 
inelastic MSAs closely track each other until 2002 when housing prices accelerated. Second, 
there is almost no difference in measures of non-house price credit demand shocks such as 
income, payroll, and employment growth between inelastic and elastic MSAs during this period.  
Third, our results are insensitive to non-parametric controls for changes in credit demand 
driven by individual income, credit score, age, and sex. Fourth, we find no statistically 
significant difference in the growth of credit card balances for homeowners living in inelastic 
versus elastic MSAs. This finding suggests that the home equity borrowing channel, and not a 
general shift in credit demand, is driving our basic result. Finally, there is no difference in the 
borrowing behavior of renters between elastic and inelastic MSAs. 
Our second instrument for house price growth exploits within-MSA variation and uses 
the interaction of the 1997 fraction of subprime borrowers in a zip code with MSA level housing 
supply inelasticity as an instrument for house price growth. The instrument is motivated by Mian 
and Sufi (2009) who show that an expansion of mortgage credit from 2002 to 2005 is associated   4
with stronger house price appreciation in subprime zip codes compared to prime zip codes, 
despite relatively declining income opportunities for subprime areas. Furthermore, as theory 
would suggest, the differential house price appreciation in subprime zip codes is present only in 
inelastic housing supply MSAs. The interaction of the 1997 share of subprime population in a zip 
code with MSA level housing supply inelasticity therefore serves as an instrument for within-
MSA house price growth.
1 Our within-MSA estimates are similar to the across-MSA estimates.  
The real effects of the home equity-based borrowing channel depend on what households 
do with the borrowed money. We find little evidence that borrowing in response to increased 
house prices is used to purchase new homes or investment properties. We also find no evidence 
that home equity-based borrowing is used to pay down credit card balances, even for households 
in the highest quartile of the 1997 credit card utilization distribution. This finding suggests that 
the marginal return to the use of borrowed funds is higher to households than the high interest 
rate on credit card debt. While we do not have data on real outlays, these findings suggest that 
consumption and home improvement are possible uses of the increased borrowing. 
We use our microeconomic estimates to calculate the aggregate impact of the home 
equity-based borrowing channel. We find that a total of $1.45 trillion of the rise in household 
debt from 2002 to 2006 is attributable to existing homeowners borrowing against the increased 
value of their homes. This translates to 2.8% of GDP per year. This is a conservative lower-
bound estimate given that it is based on a difference-in-differences estimator that ignores any 
level effect of house prices on borrowing. 
Given the large effect of house prices on homeowner borrowing, which model of 
household behavior is consistent with our estimates? We explore cross-sectional heterogeneity in 
the effect to explore this question. We find that homeowners with high credit card utilization 
rates and low credit scores at the beginning of the sample have the strongest tendency to borrow 
                                                             
1 See Section II.C for more on the within-MSA triple-difference identification strategy.   5
against increases in home equity. In fact, we find no effect of house prices on borrowing for 
homeowners in the top quartile of credit score distribution as of 1997. We also find that the 
home-equity based borrowing channel is stronger for younger homeowners. We find no evidence 
of a differential effect based on either income or gender. 
These results are consistent with a model of credit constraints under the assumption that 
low credit scores and high credit card utilization rates serve as indicators for borrowing 
difficulty. However, these characteristics may also proxy for individuals with self-control 
problems. Our finding that older individuals have a smaller home equity-based borrowing 
channel is inconsistent with standard life cycle-based models.   
The increase in homeowner leverage due to the home equity-based borrowing channel 
plays an important role in the ensuing financial crisis. Using homeowner default rate data, we 
show that borrowing against rising home equity is accompanied by a relative decline in default 
rates from 2002 to 2006, especially for low credit score and high credit card utilization 
homeowners. However, the relative decline in default rate begins to reverse starting in 2006. By 
the end of 2008, the default rate of homeowners experiencing house price appreciation from 
2002 to 2006 skyrockets past homeowners experiencing no previous house price appreciation.  
The reversal is especially strong among low credit score and high credit card utilization 
homeowners who most aggressively borrow against rising home equity during the housing 
boom. These same households also see a sharp relative reduction in auto loans from 2006 to 
2008, highlighting the link between homeowner leverage and the drop in durable consumption at 
the beginning of the current recession. 
Our findings are related to research on the effect of house price growth on consumption, 
refinancing, and borrowing behavior (Case, Quigley, and Shiller (2005), Bostic, Gabriel, and 
Painter (2009), Lehnert (2004), Haurin and Rosenthal (2006), Hurst and Stafford (2004), 
Campbell and Cocco (2007), Greenspan and Kennedy (2007), Cooper (2009)). Our results   6
complement this research by using a novel data set and a novel empirical strategy to isolate the 
effect of house prices on borrowing. We believe that the empirical strategy we utilize is of first-
order importance given that house prices, borrowing behavior, and consumption are likely jointly 
driven by unobservable permanent income shocks. In addition, we are the first in this literature to 
examine default behavior as it relates to home equity-based borrowing. 
These issues are important given that declines in housing and durable consumption often 
precede economic recessions. Leamer (2008) points out that eight of the ten post-World War II 
recessions were preceded by a decline in housing and durable consumption. The current 
recession is no different. Understanding the links between housing and the real economy 
necessitates a better understanding of the way homeowners respond to fluctuating asset prices. 
Our analysis provides microeconomic estimates on homeowners’ response to increased house 
values and the macroeconomic effect of the home equity-based borrowing channel. Our findings 
are therefore related to models in which housing plays a crucial role in the macroeconomy (Aoki, 
Proudman, and Vlieghe (2004), Iacoviello (2005), Jeske and Krueger (2005), Iacoviello and 
Manetti (2008), and Favilukis, Ludvigson, and Van Niewerburgh (2009)). 
The rest of our study proceeds as follows. The next section describes the data and 
summary statistics. Sections II through V present results, and Section VI concludes. 
I. Data and Summary Statistics 
A. Data 
  The final data set used in our analysis consists of detailed credit report information from 
Equifax for 67,489 homeowners in 2,046 zip codes located in 45 MSAs. The initial random 
sample includes a total of 266,058 individuals that live in 3,072 zip codes located in 84 MSAs 
covered by the Fiserv Case Shiller Weiss zip code level house price indices as of 1997. We 
choose to focus on the FCSW zip codes given the importance of zip code level house prices in 
our empirical tests. As noted in Mian and Sufi (2009), these zip codes represent over 45% of   7
aggregate home debt outstanding. Within these zip codes, we randomly sample individuals at a 
rate of 0.45% per zip code.  Given the importance of housing supply elasticity as an instrument 
for house price growth, we further limit the sample to zip codes located within an MSA covered 
by the Saiz (2008) topography-based elasticity measure. This reduces the sample to 189,305 
individuals within 2,076 zip codes in 45 MSAs.
2 
The Equifax data do not contain an explicit measure of homeownership. Instead, we 
measure homeownership by splitting the sample into three groups of individuals based on 1997 
credit report information. The first group (34%) contains individuals that have mortgage or home 
equity debt outstanding. The second group (9%) contains individuals that do not currently have 
mortgage or home equity debt outstanding, but their credit report indicates that they have had a 
mortgage or home equity account in the past. The third group (57%) contains individuals that do 
not have either a current or previous mortgage account. We define as “1997 homeowners” 
individuals in the first two groups.
3 
The rate of homeownership among individuals in the credit report data (43%) is 
significantly lower than the fraction of households that own their primary residence in census 
data (65%). We believe that this difference is driven by the fact that our measures are for 
individuals, not for households. As a result, individuals with no current or previous mortgage 
debt that live in a home in which some other individual has mortgage debt will not be counted as 
a homeowner. In addition, any homeowner with no previous or current mortgage debt 
outstanding will be excluded in our definition of homeownership. 
                                                             
2 In an unreported robustness test, we match the remaining FCSW zip codes to the closest MSA covered by the Saiz 
(2008) measure. The correlation between housing supply inelasticity and house price growth is slightly weakened, 
but all other results are similar. 
3 The second group includes two types of individuals that we cannot separate: individuals that own their home but 
have paid off their mortgage and individuals who previously had a mortgage but are now renters. We choose to 
count this group as homeowners given that they have a low probability of moving, which suggests that they are 
homeowners who have paid off their previous mortgage. Nonetheless, all results are materially unchanged if we 
exclude this group from our homeowner classification.   8
There are 81,264 homeowners in our sample. The final restriction we make is to exclude 
homeowners that move from their 1997 zip code between 1997 and 1999. Approximately 15% of 
homeowners move within the first two years of our sample, at which point the fraction that 
moves levels off significantly. We exclude these “transient” individuals since we want to ensure 
that when the house price shock hits, the homeowners are living in the zip code we assign them 
to initially. This leaves a final sample of 67,489 individuals in 2,046 zip codes located in 45 
MSAs.
4 
Due to restrictions on the dissemination of individual credit report information, Equifax 
only provides us data on these homeowners in groups of at least five individuals. We are free to 
sort the data in any way before the groups are formed. The primary data-sort that we utilize sorts 
homeowners by their 1997 zip code and then by their 1997 credit score before groups are 
formed. This ensures that our unit of observation, a group of 5 homeowners on average, is as 
homogenous as possible on observed characteristics. In a few tests where we estimate 
heterogeneity of our main effect, we re-sort the data to maximize available variation along the 
dimension of interest. For example, we re-sort data by zip code and then age when testing 
whether young homeowners behave differently than old homeowners. 
We augment the individual level data with several additional data sets. We use the 
following zip code level time-varying sources of data: house price data from FCSW, IRS income 
data, employment and payroll information from the Census Business Statistics, aggregate 
consumer credit score data from Equifax. All of these additional data sets are described in detail 
in the appendix of Mian and Sufi (2009). The IRS data are available only for 1998, 2002, 2003, 
2005, and 2006. We add information for missing years by interpolating data prior to 2006 and 
extrapolating data post 2006 based on observed time trends. We also use 2000 decennial census 
                                                             
4 Appendix Tables 1 and 2 show information on renters and homeowners that move zip codes between 1997 and 
1999.   9
zip code level information on demographics. Finally, the primary measure of topology-based 
housing supply elasticity comes from Saiz (2008). 
B. Summary Statistics 
Table I presents summary statistics for the sample of 67,489 1997 homeowners grouped 
into units containing 5 to 9 individuals. The median home debt (mortgage plus home equity) 
outstanding as of 1997 is $88 thousand which is higher than the average amount of $62 thousand 
reported in the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances.
5 The discrepancy is likely due to two factors: 
first, we do not count as homeowners any individual that has never used debt to finance their 
home purchase. Second, the 1998 SCF separates out debt used for the purchase of second homes 
or residential investment properties, whereas we cannot separate primary residence versus other 
residential mortgage debt. Mortgage debt makes up over 85% of total debt outstanding for 
homeowners. 
After remaining relatively constant from 1998 to 2002, total debt grows by 34% from 
2002 to 2006. This growth is driven almost exclusively by home debt. The increase in leverage 
can also be seen in the sharp increase in the total debt to income ratio, which increases by 0.7 
from 2002 to 2006, which is almost ½ a standard deviation of the 1997 level. Default rates are 
stable from 1998 to 2006, at which point they rise sharply by 3.8 percentage points from 2006 to 
2008, which is a doubling of the 1997 level. Table I also includes information on individual 1997 
credit score, 1997 credit card utilization, 1997 age, sex, and 2008 income.
6 
The housing supply elasticity measure in Saiz (2008) varies from 0 to 3 and is increasing 
in elasticity. Our measure is 3 minus the Saiz (2008) measure so that our measure increases in 
housing supply inelasticity. Appendix Table 3 shows the inelasticity measure for the 45 MSAs in 
our sample. Both the zip code level IRS wage data and the Census business statistics payroll data 
                                                             
5 See Kennickell, Starr-McCluer, and Surette (2000). 
6 Individual income data are only available from Equifax for 2008. This estimate is based on payroll data that 
Equifax matches with their records.   10
show growth of about 12% from 2002 to 2006. Employment growth is 8% over the same time 
period. One measure from Mian and Sufi (2009) that we use is the fraction of all consumers in a 
zip code with a “subprime” credit score, which is defined to be a score below 660 as of 1997. In 
our sample, homeowners on average live in a zip code with 31% subprime consumers. 
II. The Effect of House Prices on Home Equity-Based Borrowing 
A. Theoretical Motivation  
How should an individual homeowner respond to an increase in their house price, all else 
being equal? This is the thought experiment that our empirical specification attempts to 
implement using instruments for house price growth. The theoretical answer to this question 
depends on the underlying model of consumer behavior. 
A useful starting benchmark is unconstrained long-lived homeowners. These 
homeowners plan on using housing consumption in the foreseeable future, perhaps due to 
bequest motives, and are not credit-constrained when choosing their consumption paths. Sinai 
and Souleles (2005) and Campbell and Cocco (2007) show that such households are naturally 
hedged against house price fluctuations in the absence of credit constraints or substitution 
effects. Any increase in house prices makes future housing consumption more expensive. As a 
result, the propensity to borrow out of housing gains is zero.
7 
A second possible model is based on short-lived homeowners who do not value housing 
bequests very highly and plan on consuming part of their housing capital before death. Such 
homeowners would like to borrow against unexpected increases in home equity to finance 
consumption, with the propensity to borrow being strongest for older homeowners with shorter 
life horizons.  
                                                             
7 An important caveat is a situation in which homeowners have short expected tenure or a high probability of 
moving. In this case, a relative house price shock may be treated as a real wealth shock.   11
A third possibility is credit-constrained homeowners who want to borrow more today to 
smooth consumption over time, but are unable to do so due to limited collateral. Such 
homeowners would borrow more against increases in home equity to relax their budget 
constraints (Ortalo-Magne´ and Rady (2006), Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh, (2006)). Finally 
following Laibson (1997), homeowners with limited self-control may aggressively borrow 
against increased access to housing wealth in order to finance current consumption.   
B. Across MSA Empirical Strategy Based on Housing Supply Inelasticity 
  Our empirical strategy is designed to estimate the effect of house prices on home equity-
based borrowing. As the aggregate data in Figure 1 show, there is a strong correlation between 
house price growth and homeowner debt growth. However, it is possible that omitted time 
varying factors drive both house prices and borrowing behavior. Perhaps the most worrisome 
time-varying trend is changes in productivity or permanent income. 
  Our first empirical test exploits variation across MSAs in housing supply elasticity. The 
intuition of the tests is straightforward: for an equivalent housing demand shock, the slope of the 
housing supply curve determines that degree to which housing prices rise in an area. The insight 
of Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saiz (2008) is that this basic prediction holds under most models of 
house price evolution. As long as builders respond to house prices, an increase in housing supply 
puts an upper bound on house price appreciation in elastic housing supply MSAs. 
In the top panel of Figure 2, we show evidence consistent with this intuition. We compare 
MSAs in the highest and lowest quartile categories based on the Saiz (2008) housing supply 
elasticity measure. The most elastic housing supply MSAs experience almost no increase in 
house prices from 1997 to 2008. In contrast, inelastic housing supply MSAs experience strong 
growth of over 100% from 2001 to 2006. The pattern in the top panel of Figure 2 is also seen in 
our first stage estimate in column 1 of Table II, which shows a strong effect of housing supply 
inelasticity on house price growth. The magnitude suggests that a one standard deviation increase   12
in MSA housing supply inelasticity leads to a one-half standard deviation increase in house price 
growth from 2002 to 2006. 
The bottom two panels of Figure 2 show a graphical version of the reduced form 
specification estimates from our empirical model; they show that total debt growth and the 
change in debt to income is significantly higher in inelastic MSAs from 2002 to 2006. The 
growth rate is 20 percentage points higher and the debt to income change is 0.5 higher in 
inelastic MSAs relative to elastic MSAs. 
Figure 2 and the estimate in column 1 of Table II motivate the following first-differenced 
instrumental variables specification: 
(1)                 0206                                0206            
(2)                  0206                            ,            
Where LeverageGrowth0206izm represents the change in homeowner leverage from 2002 to 2006 
for individual i living in zip code z within MSA m. Equation (2) represents the first stage, where 
the instrument is MSA level housing supply inelasticity (Inelasticity). All standard errors are 
clustered at the MSA level. 
Column 2 of Table II presents the instrumental variables estimate with no control 
variables. The estimated elasticity of debt with respect to house prices is 0.6 among 
homeowners. The estimate is completely insensitive to individual level control variables when 
added linearly (column 3) or when added non-parametrically with 50 indicator variables for 2-
percentile bins (column 4). The estimate is reduced only slightly when we include a host of zip 
code level census demographic control variables and zip code level controls for the growth in 
wages, payroll, and employment (column 5). 
An alternative IV specification using the debt to income ratio also shows a positive effect 
of house prices on leverage. The estimate of 1.6 in column 6 implies that a one standard 
deviation change in house prices leads to a 1/4 standard deviation increase in the debt to income   13
ratio. As with the elasticity measures, the effect of house prices on debt to income ratios is 
completely insensitive to individual level controls (columns 7 and 8), and only slightly sensitive 
to zip code level demographics and income patterns (column 9). 
Figure 3 presents the non-parametric plot of the effect of house price growth on debt 
growth across the full distribution. It shows the second stage of the IV estimate in column 2 of 
Table II by plotting total debt growth from 2002-2006 against predicted house price growth over 
the same period. As Figure 3 shows, the effect is close to linear with a slight convexity near the 
middle of the distribution. The pattern is also robust across almost the entire distribution, 
although the statistical precision is lower at the low end of the house price growth distribution. 
In Table III, we present IV estimates of the effect of an increase in home equity on home 
borrowing in dollar units. The first stage estimate in column 1 implies that a one standard 
deviation increase in housing supply inelasticity leads to a $30 thousand increase in home equity. 
The second stage estimates in columns 2 through 5 suggest that 1997 homeowners borrow 25 to 
30 cents on every dollar of additional home equity value. As columns 3 to 5 show, the estimate is 
completely insensitive to both individual and zip code level control variables. 
One concern with the findings in Table II, Figure 3, and Table III is the validity of the 
exclusion restriction. In other words, it is possible that differential trends in inelastic and elastic 
MSAs during this time period would lead to differential borrowing patterns even in the absence 
of differential house price growth. Of course, the robustness of our findings to a series of 
rigorous control variables partially mitigates this concern, but omitted factors not captured by our 
control variables could still be a worry. 
In Table IV, we further examine the exclusion restriction. Panel A presents evidence on 
the correlation between housing supply inelasticity and zip code level measures of per capita 
payroll, per capita wage, and total employment growth. Our goal in Panel A is to present 
evidence on differential permanent income or productivity shocks that may drive household   14
borrowing and house price appreciation in inelastic areas. There is no evidence of differentially 
stronger growth in per capita payroll or employment growth. While there is a positive correlation 
between housing supply inelasticity and IRS per capita wage growth over the 2002 to 2006 time 
period, this correlation is not robust across the different measures of payroll and employment 
growth (columns 1 and 3).  
However, a comparison of the level of income growth from 2002 to 2006 is not 
necessarily the proper empirical test. As permanent income theory would predict, what matters 
for changes in household borrowing behavior is the change in expected income growth. When 
we examine the difference in growth rates between 1998-2002 and 2002-2006, we find no 
positive correlation with housing supply inelasticity. Instead, column 4 of Table IV presents 
evidence that inelastic MSAs receive a negative payroll shock from 2002 to 2006. 
In Panel B, we conduct additional tests to examine the exclusion restriction. Columns 1 
and 4 of Panel B show that the positive effect of house prices on borrowing is driven by an 
increase in home (mortgage plus home equity) debt.  The effect of house price growth on credit 
card balances is statistically insignificant and very close to 0 for the credit card balances to 
income ratio. These findings suggest that the channel through which consumers in inelastic 
MSAs increase debt outstanding is home-equity related and not a general increase in the demand 
for credit. In columns 5 and 6, we examine renters who never buy into the rising housing market 
during the sample period. As the estimates show, there is no statistically significant differential 
increase in borrowing among renters in inelastic areas. 
While it is impossible to test the exclusion restriction explicitly, there is little evidence to 
suggest that the increased homeowner borrowing that we find in inelastic housing supply MSAs 
is driven by something other than house prices. The fact that the increased borrowing is 
concentrated in home-related debt is consistent with a home equity-based borrowing channel. 
Further evidence in support of the validity of the exclusion restriction is presented in Section V   15
where we focus on cross-sectional heterogeneity in the effect of house prices on consumer 
borrowing. As we show there, there is almost no differential effect for high credit score and low 
credit card utilization borrowers, which suggests the absence of non-housing related factors 
driving our results. 
C. Within-MSA Empirical Strategy Based on 1997 Fraction of Subprime Borrowers 
  This section presents an alternative IV strategy that exploits within- MSA variation at the 
level of zip codes to identify the effect of house prices on homeowner borrowing. The motivation 
for this test comes from Mian and Sufi (2009). They present evidence of a securitization-driven 
shift in the supply of mortgages for new home purchase from 2002 to 2005 toward zip codes that 
have a high fraction of subprime borrowers. Column 1 of Panel A in Table V replicates the basic 
finding, which shows a strong positive correlation between new home purchase mortgage growth 
from 2002 to 2006 and the fraction of borrowers with a credit score below 660 as of 1997.
  Mian and Sufi (2009) show that higher credit growth for home-purchase mortgages 
occurs in subprime zip codes despite declining relative, and in some cases absolute, income 
growth in these areas. Furthermore, 2002 to 2005 is the only period in the last 18 years in which 
mortgage origination for home purchase is higher in areas with lower income growth. 
  In columns 2 to 5 of Table V, Panel A, we replicate another finding of Mian and Sufi 
(2009): the relative shift in the supply of mortgage credit for home purchase toward high 
subprime share zip codes occurs even in the most elastic MSAs where there is no significant 
house price growth. However, the shift in the supply of mortgage credit is stronger in more 
inelastic housing supply MSAs that experience strong house price growth. Based on these 
findings, Mian and Sufi (2009) argue that house price appreciation cannot fully explain the shift 
in the supply of mortgage credit to high subprime areas, but house price growth strengthens the 
effect through a collateral feedback mechanism (as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)).   16
  Column 1 of Table V, Panel B presents evidence that the shift in the supply of credit 
toward subprime share zip codes leads to higher house price growth in subprime zip codes 
relative to prime zip codes within the same MSA. Columns 2 through 5 show that this effect is 
only present in inelastic MSAs, as we would expect given the intuition on house prices and 
supply elasticity in Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saiz (2008). Mian and Sufi (2009) present evidence 
that the relative house price appreciation in high subprime share zip codes within inelastic MSAs 
is credit-induced: they find that house price growth and income growth are negatively correlated 
from 2002 to 2006 and that high subprime share zip codes experience relative house price 
growth despite relatively negative income growth. 
  Our instrumental variable strategy is designed to exploit credit-induced house price 
appreciation in high subprime share zip codes within inelastic MSAs to estimate the effect of 
house price appreciation on homeowner borrowing. The exact thought experiment is as follows. 
Take two homeowners IP and IS with the same credit score as of 1997. The homeowners live in 
the same inelastic MSA, but differ in the neighborhood of residence. Homeowner IP lives in a 
prime neighborhood, while IS lives in a subprime neighborhood. We know from Mian and Sufi 
(2009) that IS experiences a larger house price increase than IP as a result of the aggregate credit 
supply expansion. Let BIS and BIP be the change in household borrowing for IS and IP 
respectively during the price boom period. Then the double difference (BIS - BIP) provides one 
possible reduced form measure of the effect of house prices on homeowner borrowing. 
However, a concern with this estimate is that despite IS and IP having the same initial 
credit score, the fact that they live in different neighborhoods potentially makes them different 
on unobserved dimensions. The unobserved dimensions could also affect the borrowing 
decisions in a way that makes (BIS - BIP) a biased estimate of the direct house price effect.    17
How does one control for the unobserved neighborhood effect of subprime versus prime 
neighborhoods? The triple-difference strategy exploits the additional variation in housing supply 
elasticity. In particular, as mentioned earlier, the difference in house prices of subprime versus 
prime neighborhood disappears in elastic MSAs due to easily adjustable housing supply. 
However, the unobserved dimension of neighborhood effects is still operating on homeowners 
living in elastic MSAs. Let ES and EP be two homeowners with the same initial credit scores as 
IS and IP. ES and EP live in subprime and prime neighborhoods of an elastic MSA respectively.  
Then we can control for the unobserved neighborhood effect of homeowners living in subprime 
areas by computing the triple difference: [(BIS - BIP)- (BES - BEP)]. 
This idea translates into estimating the following reduced form regression equation: 
(3)              ,                                               ,       
                      ,                    ,                       1999,2000,…,2008 
which examines the growth in y from the base year 1998 to t for individual i living in zip code z 
within MSA m. We relate the growth in y to MSA fixed effects, individual and zip code level 
control variables (X), the fraction of subprime borrowers (Subprime) in zip code z within MSA m 
in 1997, and the interaction between the zip code fraction of subprime borrowers and the housing 
supply inelasticity (Inelasticity) of MSA m. The coefficient of interest is . 
  Figure 4 presents the estimate of  for years 1999 to 2008. The top panel examines the 
relative growth in house prices for high subprime share zip codes in highly inelastic MSAs. 
Consistent with the estimates in Panel B of Table V, house price growth is strongest in subprime 
zip codes of inelastic MSAs. In terms of magnitudes, the coefficient estimate for 2006 implies 
that in the most inelastic MSA, a one standard deviation increase in the 1997 subprime share of 
the zip code leads to a 15% increase in house prices from 2002 to 2006. 
The bottom two graphs show a relative increase in debt growth and debt to income ratios 
for homeowners living in high subprime share zip codes within highly inelastic MSAs. Once   18
again, these graphs are based on a triple-difference estimate which compares homeowner 
leverage in high subprime share zip codes within inelastic MSAs to both homeowners in high 
subprime share zip codes in elastic MSAs and homeowners in low subprime share zip codes in 
the same MSA. In terms of magnitudes, the coefficient estimate for 2006 implies that in the most 
inelastic MSA, a one standard deviation increase in the 1998 subprime share of the zip code 
leads to a 9% increase in debt and a 1/2 standard deviation increase in the homeowner debt to 
income ratio from 2002 to 2006. 
  Figure 4 suggests that a potential instrument for house prices is the zip code level share of 
subprime borrowers as of 1997 interacted with MSA housing supply inelasticity. In Panel C of 
Table V, we examine how this instrument is correlated with debt and debt to income levels in 
2002. As Panel C shows, homeowners’ debt amounts and debt to income ratios in high subprime 
share zip codes within inelastic MSAs are not significantly different than homeowners in high 
subprime share zip codes within elastic MSAs prior to the house price acceleration in 2002.  
  The results in Table V and Figure 4 together with the results in Mian and Sufi (2009) 
motivate the following within-MSA instrumental variables specification: 
(4)                 0206                              ,       
                 0206             
(5)                  0206                               ,       
           ,                    ,             
Equation (5) represents the first stage in which house price growth from 2002 to 2006 is 
instrumented with the interaction of zip code level subprime share as of 1997 and MSA level 
housing supply inelasticity. Equation (4) represents the second stage in which we examine the 
growth in leverage for homeowners as a function of predicted house price growth. The control 
variables in X include median home value in the zip code and individual credit score, income, 
sex, and age. The control variables imply that we are comparing two homeowners with the same   19
age, same credit score, same sex, and same income, but one resides in a high subprime share zip 
code within an inelastic housing supply MSA. 
  The second stage estimates for both debt growth and the change in debt to income are 
presented in Table VI. The estimates from the within-MSA specification are slightly higher than 
the estimates from the across-MSA analysis presented in the previous sub-section. The inclusion 
of control variables does not change the debt growth specification estimate. However, the effect 
of house price growth on the change in debt to income is more sensitive to the inclusion of 
control variables. 
  The within-MSA approach in Table VI explores a different source of house price 
variation relative to the across-MSA approach of Table II. In econometric terms, both the across 
and within approaches are local average treatment effect (LATE) estimators with the “local 
average” computed over mutually exclusive parts of the house price distribution. Yet the two 
approaches produce quite consistent estimates of the effect of house prices on homeowner 
borrowing. It should be kept in mind that the majority of the overall house price variation is 
across MSAs.
8 For this reason, the across-MSA estimate is economically more meaningful, 
while the within-MSA estimate serves as a useful robustness check. 
III. The Macroeconomic Impact of the Home Equity-Based Borrowing Channel 
A. What Are Consumers Doing with Borrowed Money? 
  What do homeowners do with the money borrowed against home equity? The question is 
important in order to understand the real effects of the home equity-based borrowing channel. 
For example, if home equity borrowing is used to pay down other more expensive forms of 
consumer credit such as credit card debt, then home equity borrowing may not have a large 
                                                             
8 Variance decomposition of house price growth from 2002 to 2006 at the zip code level reveals a between-MSA 
standard deviation of 0.22 and a within-MSA standard deviation of 0.06. See Table I in Mian and Sufi (2009).   20
aggregate impact. However, if home equity-based borrowing is used primarily for consumption 
or home improvement, then the real and policy implications are substantial. 
  We first test whether high house prices lead homeowners to “trade up” by taking a bigger 
mortgage to move to a bigger home. Our data records the current zip code of each individual 
borrower. We can therefore construct an indicator variable for whether a homeowner moves 
from 2002 to 2006. Columns 1 and 2 of Panel A in Table VII show that house price appreciation 
is not correlated with the probability of moving. This is true when examining the OLS 
specification or when using MSA housing supply inelasticity as an instrument for house price 
growth. These estimates are inconsistent with the argument that households are much more likely 
to move to new homes after realizing an increased value of home equity. In columns 3 and 4, 
respectively, we split the sample into homeowners that move and do not move zip codes between 
2002 and 2006. The elasticity of debt growth with respect to house price growth is similar in 
both samples. Taken together, the estimates in Panel A are inconsistent with the argument that 
homeowners use borrowed money primarily to finance the purchase of new homes. 
  In Panel B, we examine whether homeowners use the increased value of home equity to 
buy investment properties. This may be a concern given that the percentage of households in the 
Survey of Consumer Finances that have outstanding debt on a residential property other than 
their primary residence increased from 4.6% in 2001 to 5.5% in 2007 (Bucks, Kennickell, Mach, 
and Moore (2009), Aizcorbe, Kennickell, and Moore (2003)). While we do not have data on the 
purchase of investment properties, the consumer credit reports contain the number of mortgage 
accounts. Under the assumption that consumers must obtain a new mortgage to purchase an 
investment property, we should detect any systematic use of increased home equity to purchase 
an investment property by examining the number of mortgage accounts. 
  Column 1 and 2 of Panel B show that the change in the number of mortgage accounts 
from 2002 to 2006 is negatively correlated with house price growth. In other words, our   21
estimates suggest that homeowners in high house price appreciation MSAs are less likely to buy 
investment properties. In column 3, we control for the change in the number of mortgage 
accounts and find a similar elasticity of debt growth with respect to house price growth. Finally, 
in column 4, we exclude any consumer with any change in the number of mortgage accounts and 
find a similar estimate of the effect of house price growth on debt growth. Taken together, the 
evidence in Panel B is inconsistent with the hypothesis that households use increased home 
equity to buy investment properties. 
  We do not have individual information on financial assets. However, evidence from the 
Survey of Consumer Finances is inconsistent with the view that homeowners use borrowing to 
buy additional financial assets.
9 According to the SCF, the fraction of families holding almost 
every class of financial security declined from 2001 to 2007. This is true of stocks (21.3% to 
17.9%), savings bonds (16.7% to 14.9%), and pooled investment vehicles (17.7% to 11.4%). 
Only retirement accounts increased slightly (52.2% to 52.6%). Conditional on having a financial 
asset, the SCF reports a decline in the median value of financial assets from $29.8 thousand to 
$25.3 thousand from 2001 to 2007. 
  One additional fact is also inconsistent with the hypothesis that consumers use home 
equity-based borrowing to purchase financial assets. As we show in the next section, the home 
equity borrowing channel is stronger among low credit quality and high credit card utilization 
individuals. Evidence from the SCF suggests that participation among lower income and lower 
net worth individuals dropped even more dramatically than the average from 2001 to 2007. 
  The evidence is inconsistent with the argument that consumers borrowed against 
increased home equity to purchase real estate or financial assets. In Panel C, we explore whether 
consumers use increased home equity-based borrowing to pay down outstanding credit card 
                                                             
9 See Bucks, Kennickell, Mach, and Moore (2009), Aizcorbe, Kennickell, and Moore (2003), and Bucks, 
Kennickell, and Moore (2006)   22
balances. This is a useful exercise given that the mean interest rate on outstanding credit card 
debt is 12.5% according to the SCF (Bucks, Kennickell, Mach, and Moore (2009)). If consumers 
do not pay down credit card balances, then it suggests that homeowners derive considerable 
marginal utility from the use of home-equity based borrowing. 
  Panel C isolates the sample to homeowners in the top quartile of the credit card 
utilization distribution as of 1997. The mean credit card balance outstanding among this group is 
almost $10 thousand and the mean credit card utilization rate (amount outstanding divided by the 
high limit) is 0.71. Column 1 shows an elasticity of home debt borrowing with respect to house 
price growth of 0.8 among this sample. Despite the large increase in home-equity based 
borrowing and the large amount of outstanding credit card balances, the estimates in columns 2 
and 4 show that these individuals do not pay down credit card balances in response to house 
price growth.
10 While we cannot see the exact use of borrowed funds in our data, the results in 
Panel C suggest that the marginal return to the use of borrowed funds is quite high. 
While we do not have direct data on real outlays by individuals, we are able to 
demonstrate that consumers do not use home equity-based borrowing to buy real estate or 
financial assets, and consumers do not use borrowed funds to pay down credit card debt with a 
high interest rate. While more evidence is needed, our findings are suggestive that a large 
fraction of home equity-based borrowing is used for consumption or home improvement. This 
conclusion is consistent with survey evidence by Brady, Canner, and Maki (2000) who find that 
from 1998 to 1999, 40% of households cite home improvement as a reason for home equity 
extraction, and 39% cite consumer expenditures. Using similar survey data, Canner, Dynan, and 
Passmore (2002) find that over 50% of funds liquefied from home equity are used for either 
                                                             
10 Ideally, we would want to examine outstanding credit card debt on which interest is being paid. However, the 
credit bureau only collects outstanding credit card balances. Several tests suggest that balances are strongly 
correlated with outstanding debt, especially among high credit card utilization individuals. Increases in credit card 
balances are strongly positively correlated with future default, and outstanding credit card balances are strongly 
negatively correlated with credit scores. Further, given that all of our tests are done in first-differences, any error in 
using balances instead of debt that is similar across housing supply elasticity is removed.   23
home improvement or consumer expenditures. 
B. The Macroeconomic Impact of the Household Borrowing Channel 
Since our estimates of the home equity-based borrowing channel is based on a 
representative sample of the U.S., we can integrate our estimated effect to compute the economy 
wide magnitude of home equity-based borrowing due to higher house prices. 
How much of the increase in mortgage credit can be attributed to a direct effect of 
existing homeowners borrowing against the increasing value of their housing equity? We start 
with our baseline estimate of column 2 in Table II that suggests that homeowners increase their 
total borrowing by 0.6 percent for every 1.0 percent increase in house prices. Since our estimated 
effect is based on a difference in differences approach, the level impact of house prices on 
borrowing is not identifiable. Therefore, the appropriate in-sample aggregate effect of our 
estimate should be computed using relative differences in house price growth. 
Let i  index an MSA such that the MSAs are ordered by their housing supply inelasticity 
with i=1 being the most elastic. Let ∆      be the predicted percentage change in house prices for 
MSA i given its supply inelasticity. Given our home equity-based borrowing elasticity estimate 
of 0.6, the average percentage change in total borrowing due to the house price channel for 
homeowner living in MSA i is given by  0.6    ∆       ∆       ]. Since we know each homeowner’s 
level of initial debt, we can convert the percentage change in debt into new debt taken out in 
dollars. Aggregating this procedure for all MSAs gives us an aggregate borrowing due to house 
price appreciation effect of $1.45 trillion dollars over four years from 2002 to 2006.
11 This 
increase represents 59.2% of the overall increase in debt of homeowners from 2002 to 2006. 
                                                             
11 The sum of home equity-based borrowing over our regression sample is equal to $2.21 billion. Since our random 
sample has a sampling rate of 0.494%, and we dropped 18.3% of homeowners (dollar-weighted) due to early moves, 
the total effect in our sample of zip codes is: $2.21/(0.00494*(1-0.183))= $548 billion. The zip codes in our 
regression sample represent 26.5% of U.S. household credit in 2002. To estimate the home-equity borrowing 
channel effect for remaining zip codes not in our sample, we apply our home equity-based borrowing elasticity 
estimate of 0.6 to the house price appreciation for these zip codes. House price appreciation is measured using zip 
code level price estimate from zillow.com wherever possible, and using MSA level OFHEO price index otherwise.   24
The aggregate increase in debt due to house price appreciation represents 2.8% of GDP 
per year over the four years. While we do not have data on real outlays, our previous evidence 
suggests that it is likely that some of the borrowings are used for consumption and home 
improvement. If we take the extreme view that all of borrowed money is used for real outlays, 
then our estimate helps explain the drop in the savings rate during this time period. 
IV. Does the Home Equity-Based Borrowing Channel Vary By Consumer Type? 
Our estimates above suggest a large response of homeowner borrowing to increases in 
the value of home equity. In this section, we explore cross-sectional heterogeneity of the effect. 
Our goal is to provide insight into the underlying model of consumer behavior that is most 
consistent with the home equity-based borrowing channel. 
We first examine how the propensity to borrow against increased home equity varies by 
the homeowner’s base year credit score and credit card utilization rate. Credit scores play an 
important role in the availability and pricing of consumer credit, and consumers below critical 
thresholds are often unable to obtain financing at reasonable interest rates.
12 Credit card 
utilization rate is measured by the fraction of the total available credit card limit that is used. 
Credit scores and credit card utilization rates have a correlation coefficient of -0.88 in our sample 
of homeowners, and an OLS regression of one on the other yields an R
2 of 0.78. The literature on 
consumer credit often interprets low credit scores and high credit card utilization rates as 
indicators for liquidity constrained households (see Gross and Souleles (2002)). However, such 
variables may also be systematically correlated with an underlying behavioral attribute of 
households such as self-control problems. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
For 16.6% of dollar-weighted zip codes, we do not have any house price data and assume a home equity borrowing 
effect of 0 to be conservative. The aggregate home equity borrowing effect comes out to be $1.45 trillion. 
12 See http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/reports/moseley/chap6.htm and congressional testimony of Staten 
(2004) at http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/033004ms.pdf#page=3.   25
  The top four panels of Figure 5 examine debt growth patterns for inelastic and elastic 
MSAs by 1997 homeowner credit score and credit card utilization rate. We define “high” and 
“low” categories as the top and bottom quartile of the respective distribution. The top panel of 
Figure 5 shows a very strong home equity-based borrowing effect for low credit quality 
borrowers. In contrast there is almost no effect for high quality borrowers as both elastic and 
inelastic debt growth path are similar throughout the sample period. A similar pattern is revealed 
in the middle panel that uses 1997 credit card utilization to separate borrowers.   
The top four panels of Figure 5 provide support for the exclusion restriction in our 
instrumental variables specification. The fact that there is almost no difference in borrowing 
between inelastic and elastic MSAs for high credit quality and low credit card utilization zip 
codes is inconsistent with a general non-housing related credit demand shift in inelastic MSAs. 
An alternative channel for higher borrowing in inelastic MSAs must explain why the effect is 
absent in high credit score and low credit card utilization individuals. 
  As we discuss in Section II.A, a standard model without liquidity constraints 
hypothesizes that older consumers should be more willing to extract cash from the increased 
value of home equity. The bottom two panels of Figure 5 do not show evidence in favor of this 
hypothesis. We split the sample into consumers in the lowest and highest quartile of the age 
distribution, and we find that inelastic-elastic differential in debt growth is not significantly 
different for young and old homeowners. 
  Table VIII presents regression equivalent results for Figure 5 by estimating the following 
specification: 
(6)                 0206                                0206       
                 0206                                               
(7)                  0206                            ,       
              ,                                                 26
As equation (7) shows, the instruments in the first stage are housing supply inelasticity and 
housing supply inelasticity interacted with the relevant interaction variable listed at the top of the 
column in Table VIII. In column 1, the estimated coefficient on the interaction term is negative, 
which implies that the effect of house price growth on home equity-based borrowing from 2002 
to 2006 is lower for individuals with a higher 1997 credit score. The magnitude of the difference 
is large. For a consumer one standard deviation above the mean 1997 credit score, the elasticity 
of debt with respect to house prices is 0.35. For a consumer one standard deviation below the 
mean 1997 credit score, the elasticity is 0.83. 
  The positive estimate on the interaction term in column 2 implies that individuals with a 
high credit card utilization rate have a larger borrowing response to house price growth. The 
estimate implies that for a consumer one standard deviation below the mean 1997 credit card 
utilization rate, the elasticity of debt with respect to house prices is 0.37. For a consumer one 
standard deviation above the mean 1997 credit card utilization rate, the elasticity is 0.85. 
  The coefficient estimate on the interaction term is not significant for either sex or 
household income. The coefficient estimate on the age interaction term in column 4 is negative 
and marginally statistically significant with a p-value of 0.11. In column 5, we create an 
independent interaction term for homeowners over the age of 65. As the interaction term 
coefficient estimate shows, individuals over 65 have a lower sensitivity of borrowing to house 
price growth. The evidence suggests that the borrowing of older consumers is less responsive to 
house price growth than young consumers, which is inconsistent with standard life-cycle models 
of consumer financial behavior.
13 
V. Home Equity-Based Borrowing and the Financial Crisis 
                                                             
13 In unreported results, we find similar results for cross-sectional heterogeneity of the home equity-based borrowing 
effect using the within-MSA specification outlined in Section II.C.    27
The evidence above shows the importance of the home equity-based borrowing channel 
during the U.S. housing boom. What role did the unprecedented increase in leverage for high 
house price growth homeowners play in the ensuing financial crisis? A unique advantage of our 
data set is that we can estimate the default rate implications of aggressive home equity-based 
borrowing when house price growth decelerates and turns negative. Moreover, since the 
purchase of autos (a key durable good) is often financed through auto loans, we can estimate the 
effect of household leverage in explaining the plummet of auto sales during the downturn. 
  The top panel in Figure 6 examines total debt default rates for 1997 homeowners in the 
highest and lowest quartile MSAs based on house price inelasticity. As previous results show, 
homeowners in inelastic MSAs experience both a sharp rise in house price growth and home 
equity-based borrowing from 2002 to 2006 relative to homeowners in elastic MSAs. As the top 
panel shows, there is a contemporaneous relative decline in the default rate for homeowners in 
inelastic versus elastic MSAs. From 2006 to 2008, default rates for homeowners in inelastic 
MSAs experience a sharp increase in default rates, surpassing the default rate in inelastic areas. 
  We also split the sample into borrowers in the lowest and highest quartile of the credit 
quality distribution. As the middle panel shows, low credit quality borrowers in inelastic MSAs 
experience a very sharp relative decline in default rates. From 2001 to 2005, the default rate falls 
by almost five full percentage points in inelastic MSAs, whereas it falls by only two percentage 
points in elastic MSAs. Recall that it is precisely low credit quality borrowers in inelastic MSAs 
that experience the largest increase in home equity-based borrowing during this time period. 
  When house prices begin to decelerate and fall from 2006 to 2008, the default rate for 
low credit quality borrowers in inelastic MSAs skyrockets past the default rate for high credit 
quality borrowers. The magnitude is very large. The default rate for low credit quality 
homeowners increases by more than 12 percentage points from 2005 to 2008 in inelastic MSAs. 
The corresponding increase in elastic MSAs is less than 4 percentage points.   28
  Table IX presents estimates of the effect of house price growth on the change in default 
rates from 2002 to 2006. The instrumental variables specification in columns 1 and 2 is similar to 
the specification outlined in equations (1) and (2) above, except we examine default rates as the 
outcome variable. Consistent with Figure 6, we find a negative correlation between default rates 
and house price growth from 2002 to 2006. The estimate in column 2 implies that a one standard 
deviation increase in house prices leads to a 1 percentage point decrease in default rates. 
  In columns 3 through 7, we examine how house price growth differentially affects the 
decline in default rates from 2002 to 2006 for different homeowners. The instrumental variables 
specification is similar to the specification outlined in equations (6) and (7) above. The estimates 
in columns 3 and 4 show that lower credit quality and higher credit card utilization rate 
homeowners experience an even stronger decline in default rates from 2002 to 2006. In other 
words, the exact same borrowers experiencing the largest effect of house prices on home equity-
based borrowing also experience the largest declines in default rates from 2002 to 2006. 
  Table X presents the analogous specifications that examine the increase in default rates 
from 2006 to 2008. The coefficient estimate on house price growth in column 2 is positive and 
statistically distinct from zero at a high confidence level. In other words, lagged house price 
growth strongly predicts future default rates. As the specifications with interaction terms show, 
the effect of lagged house price growth on future defaults is strongest among low credit quality 
and high credit card utilization households. The magnitude of the difference is very large. 
Among homeowners one standard deviation below the mean 1997 credit score, a one standard 
deviation increase in house prices from 2002 to 2006 leads to a full standard deviation increase 
in default rates from 2006 to 2008. In contrast, among homeowners one standard deviation above 
the mean 1997 credit score, a one standard deviation increase in house prices from 2002 to 2006 
leads to 1/6 standard deviation increase in default rates from 2006 to 2008.    29
To obtain the macroeconomic magnitudes, we can repeat our analysis from Section III.B 
to examine the effect of house price appreciation on total defaults for the U.S. economy. Taking 
the estimate of 0.085 from column 1 of Table X, we find that defaults due to the home equity-
based borrowing channel represent 34.8% percent of total new defaults in the U.S. economy. 
This suggests that the current mortgage default crisis is not entirely driven by individuals buying 
into a rising housing market. A significant part of the default crisis is driven by existing 
homeowners borrowing heavily against the rising value of their house. 
Figure 7 provides suggestive evidence on the effect of increased household leverage on 
the consumption contraction during the recent recession. The top panel compares the evolution 
of auto loans for elastic and inelastic MSAs for homeowners in the top and bottom quartile of 
credit score distribution as of 1997. The top-left panel shows a sharp (relative) reduction in auto 
loans starting in 2006 for low credit quality homeowners living in inelastic MSAs. The 
magnitude of this drop is also large at almost 20%. There is no such relative drop for high credit 
quality homeowners living in inelastic MSAs.  
The bottom panel repeats this exercise for homeowners in the top and bottom quartile of 
credit card utilization distribution in 1997. Consistent with the top panel, homeowners with a 
high credit card utilization rate as of 1997 significantly cut back their purchase of autos with 
financing, while there is no such effect for homeowners with low credit card utilization. In 
unreported regression results, we find that the differential drop in auto loans over 2006 to 2008 
for homeowners in inelastic MSAs is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
From 2002 to 2006, high credit card utilization rate and low credit score homeowners in 
high house price growth MSAs borrow heavily against the increased value of home equity and 
experience a sharp relative decline in default rates. These same individuals experience a very 
large relative increase in default rates and sharp reduction in auto loans when house prices   30
decelerate and fall from 2006 to 2008. These results highlight the important role that increased 
homeowner leverage played in the financial and economic downturn of recent years. 
VI. Conclusion 
We provide evidence of a strong link between asset prices and household borrowing 
decisions. The use of individual level data and an instrumental variables methodology enables us 
to precisely estimate the magnitude of the home equity-based borrowing channel. Since our 
individual level data is representative of U.S. household sector, we can provide an estimate of the 
economy-wide effect of the rise in house prices on household borrowing during the period of 
strong house price growth from 2002 to 2006.  
The macroeconomic estimate of the effect of house price on household borrowing is 
large. We also show evidence that the increase in homeowner borrowing is not used to buy new 
houses, buy investment properties, or pay down costly consumer debt. Taken together, these 
findings lend support to the view that home equity-based borrowing is used for real outlays. 
While the effect of collateral on macroeconomic fluctuations has typically focused on business 
investment (Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)), our evidence suggests 
that fluctuations in house prices and household credit availability may play an important role in 
the evolution of business cycles. Exploring this link is an important question moving forward. 
Our results also highlight the importance of understanding the microeconomic 
foundations of household behavior. We find that the home equity-based borrowing channel is 
driven primarily by homeowners with low credit scores and high credit card utilization rates. 
This may suggest that house price appreciation allows previously credit-constrained homeowners 
to move toward their optimal level of borrowing and consumption. However, it may also imply 
house price appreciation provides greater access to borrowing for homeowners that suffer from 
behavioral biases such as adaptive house price expectations (Agarwal (2007)), dynamically 
inconsistent preferences, or self-control problems.  31
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This table presents summary statistics for 67,489 individuals who have either an existing mortgage account with 
positive balance as of 1997 or a previous mortgage account. The sample is further restricted to individuals that do 
not move zip codes between 1997 and 1999. Individuals are sorted into groups of at least 5 individuals. Each group 
consists of individuals living in the same zip code as of 1997, and the individuals are sorted by 1997 credit score 
before groups are formed. The income in the denominator of the debt to income ratio comes from zip level IRS data. 
The zip code level median home value as of 2002 comes from the 2000 value reported in the decennial Census 
multiplied by the growth rate from 2000 to 2002 reported in the Fiserv Case Shiller Weiss data. The housing supply 
inelasticity measure we use is three – the Saiz (2008) measure. The Saiz (2008) measure is increasing in elasticity 
from 0 to 3. There are 2,046 zip codes and 45 MSAs that are represented in the sample.
      
 N  Mean  Median  St.  Dev. 
Equifax individual level data      
Total debt, 1997, $thousands  12161  101  95  72 
Home debt, 1997, $thousands  12161  88  83  71 
Growth in total debt, 1998-2002  12161  0.089  0.080  0.620 
Growth in total debt, 2002-2006  12161  0.339  0.313  0.681 
Growth in home debt, 1998-2002  12161  0.099  0.052  0.901 
Growth in home debt, 2002-2006  12161  0.389  0.350  0.899 
Total debt to income ratio, 1997  11872  2.507  2.494  1.504 
Change in debt to income ratio, 1998-2002  12160  0.007  -0.071  0.900 
Change in debt to income ratio, 2002-2006  12160  0.736  0.413  1.364 
Total debt default rate, 1997  12161  0.039  0.000  0.112 
Change in default rate, 1998-2006  12158  -0.006  0.000  0.133 
Change in default rate, 2006-2008  12153  0.038  0.000  0.168 
Credit score, 1997  12161  779  788  95 
Credit card utilization fraction, 1997  12160  0.333  0.261  0.256 
Age, 1997  12160  58  57  7 
Male  12148 0.513 0.500 0.257 
Income,  1997,  $thousands  12160  79 74 35 
      
Fiserv Case Shiller Weiss zip level data      
House price growth, zip level, 1998-2002  12122  0.394  0.415  0.140 
House price growth, zip level, 2002-2006  12161  0.463  0.466  0.232 
      
Saiz (2008) MSA level elasticity measure      
Housing  supply  inelasticity  12161 1.978 2.080 0.473 
      
Median home value, 2002, $thousands  12152  228  193  135 
      
IRS zip level  income data      
Per capita wage growth, 2002-2006  12160  0.116  0.110  0.063 
      
 Census business statistics zip level data      
Per capita payroll growth, 2002-2006  11850  0.118  0.118  0.122 
Employment  growth,  2002-2006  11850 0.083 0.073 0.190 
      
Equifax zip level aggregate data      
Fraction of zip code  
with credit score under 659, 1997 
12161 0.307 0.293 0.119 
 Table II 
The Effect of House Prices on Household Borrowing for 1997 Homeowners 
This table presents estimates of the effect of house prices on household borrowing for individuals who have either an existing mortgage account with positive 
balance as of 1997 or a previous mortgage account. Individual dummy variables are quintile indicator variables for 2% bins of the 1997 credit score, 2008 
income, and 1997 age variables. Census controls are zip code level variables for the vacancy rate, fraction white, fraction black, education indicator variables for 
less than high school and high school diploma only, the unemployment rate, the poverty rate, and the fraction of households in the zip code living in an urban 
setting, all measured as of 2000. Income controls are zip code level variables from the IRS and Census business statistics for the logarithm of the 2002 
employment, per capita wage, and per capita payroll level, and the growth in wage, payroll and employment from 1997 to 2000, 2000 to 2002, and 2002 to 2006.  
All standard errors are clustered at the MSA level.
           
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 




Total debt growth 
2002-2006 
Change in total debt to income ratio 
2002-2006 
           
Housing  supply  inelasticity  0.213**          
  ( 0 . 0 6 0 )           
Instrumented  HP  growth,  2002-2006    0.602** 0.614** 0.619** 0.539** 1.599** 1.722** 1.742** 1.313** 
    (0.157) (0.150) (0.148) (0.113) (0.344) (0.362) (0.365) (0.254) 
(Credit  score,  1997)/100     -0.026*      -0.100**    
     (0.012)      (0.029)    
Ln(household  income,  2008)     0.142**      0.214**    
     (0.020)      (0.044)    
Age,  1997     -0.011**      -0.034**    
     (0.001)      (0.003)    
Male dummy variable      0.022  0.024  0.013    0.182**  0.181**  0.117* 
      (0.026) (0.024) (0.025)  (0.062)  (0.058)  (0.054) 
















N  12161 12161 12146 12146 11473 12160 12145 12145 11473 
R
2  0.19 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.06 0.11 
**,*, +  coefficient statistically distinct from 0 at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
  Table III 
The Effect of House Prices on Household Borrowing for 1997 Homeowners, Dollar for Dollar Changes 
This table presents estimates of the effect of house prices on household borrowing for individuals who have either an existing mortgage account with positive 
balance as of 1997 or a previous mortgage account. Individual dummy variables are quintile indicator variables for 2% bins of the 1997 credit score, 2008 
income, and 1997 age variables. Census controls are zip code level variables for the vacancy rate, fraction white, fraction black, education indicator variables for 
less than high school and high school diploma only, the unemployment rate, the poverty rate, and the fraction of households in the zip code living in an urban 
setting, all measured as of 2000. Income controls are zip code level variables from the IRS and Census business statistics for the logarithm of the 2002 
employment, per capita wage, and per capita payroll level, and the growth in wage, payroll and employment from 1997 to 2000, 2000 to 2002, and 2002 to 2006.  
All standard errors are clustered at the MSA level. All standard errors are clustered at the MSA level. 
            
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)     
Left hand side variable 
 
Change in home value 
2002-2006 
$thousands 




            
Housing  supply  inelasticity  63.433**          
  (17.773)          
Instrumented change in home value, 2002-2006    0.245**  0.298**  0.302**  0.289**     
    (0.051) (0.056) (0.056) (0.080)     
Median home value, 2002  0.464**  0.017  -0.028  -0.030  -0.117     
  (0.112)  (0.042) (0.055) (0.051) (0.101)     
(Credit score, 1997)/100      -6.902**         
     (1.092)        
Ln(household income, 2008)      25.425**         
     (4.770)        
Age, 1997      -2.123**         
     (0.238)        
Male dummy variable      11.302*  11.172*  8.889*     
     (4.700)  (4.576)  (4.405)     






N  12152  12152 12137 12137 11473     
R
2  0.57  0.03 0.06 0.08 0.10     
**,*, +  coefficient statistically distinct from 0 at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 Table IV 
Examining Exclusion Restriction for MSA-level Analysis 
This table presents evidence on the exclusion restriction for the MSA-level analysis in Tables II and III. Panel A examines the correlation between economic 
activity and housing supply elasticity in the sample of homeowners. “Growth shocks” represent the differences in 1998 to 2002 and 2002 to 2006 growth rates 
for each respective variable. Panel B examines the home debt and credit card balances for homeowners and debt patterns for renters. Renters are defined as 
individuals that have no housing related debt from 1997 to 2006. All standard errors are clustered at the MSA level. 
        
Panel A: Income and employment measures 
        
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Left hand side variable  Business payroll 
growth 
2002-2006  











        
Housing supply inelasticity  -0.001  0.026** -0.016 -0.027** 0.001  -0.006 
 (0.009)  (0.005)  (0.022)  (0.010) (0.008) (0.020) 
N  1990 2045 1990 1969 2045 1969 
R
2  0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
        
        
Panel B: Home, credit card, and renters’ debt
        
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sample Homeowners  Homeowners  Homeowners  Homeowners  Renters  Renters 
        






Change in home 
debt to income 
2002-2006 
Change in credit 
card balance to 
income 
2002-2006 
Total debt growth 
2002-2006 
Change in total 
debt to income 
2002-2006 
        
Instrumented HP growth, 2002-2006  0.628**  0.191  1.491**  0.021  0.103  0.022 
 (0.177)  (0.183)  (0.311)  (0.024) (0.160) (0.043) 
N  12161 12161 12160 12160  4625  4624 
R
2  0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
**,*, +  coefficient statistically distinct from 0 at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 Table V 
Motivation for Within-MSA Test Based on 1997 Subprime Share of Zip Code Population 
Panel A shows the effect of subprime fraction in the zip code on mortgage origination growth for home purchase at the zip code level by MSA housing supply 
elasticity. The zip code level mortgage origination growth data come from HMDA. Panel B shows the effect of the 1997 fraction of subprime individuals in the 
zip code on house price growth from 2002 to 2006 by MSA housing supply elasticity. Panel C shows the correlation between the instrument, subprime share of 
total population interacted with housing supple elasticity, and measures of debt as of 2002. Individual dummy variables are quintile indicator variables for 2% 
bins of the 2002 median home value in the zip code, 1997 credit score, 2008 income, and 1997 age variables.  All specifications include MSA fixed effects and 
standard errors are clustered at the MSA level. 
 
Panel A: Mortgage origination growth for new home purchase (HMDA), 2002-2006
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Full  Most  elastic  2
nd quartile  3
rd quartile  Most inelastic 
       
Fraction in zip code with credit score under 660, 1997  1.434**  0.696*  0.763*  1.820**  1.893** 
  (0.185) (0.252) (0.297) (0.187) (0.216) 
       
 
Panel B: House price growth, 2002-2006 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Full  Most  elastic  2
nd quartile  3
rd quartile  Most inelastic 
       
Fraction in zip code with credit score under 660, 1997  0.282**  -0.014  0.113+  0.330**  0.459** 
  (0.058) (0.022) (0.060) (0.056) (0.080) 
       
 
Panel C: Correlation of instrument with measures of debt as of 2002
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   
Dependent variable  Ln(total debt, 2002)  Total debt to income ratio, 2002   
       
Fraction in zip code with credit score under 660, 1997  -0.214  0.055  0.584  0.227   
 *Housing supply inelasticity  (0.182) (0.138) (0.400) (0.435)   
       
Fraction in zip code with credit score under 660, 1997  -1.005**  -0.068  1.224  2.190*   
  (0.332) (0.310) (0.733) (0.873)   
Additional control variables    Individual 
dummy variables 
 Individual 
dummy variables   
**,*, +  coefficient statistically distinct from 0 at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
 Table VI 
The Effect of House Prices on Household Borrowing for 1997 Homeowners 
Using Within-MSA Variation 
This table presents second stage estimates from a within-MSA instrumental variables specification where the first stage instrument for house price growth from 
2002 to 2006 is the fraction in the zip code with a credit score under 660 as of 1997 interacted with MSA level housing supply inelasticity. Individual dummy 
variables are quintile indicator variables for 2% bins of the 2002 median home value in the zip code, 1997 credit score, 2008 income, and 1997 age variables.  All 
specifications (both first and second stage) include MSA fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the MSA level. 
        
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable  Total debt growth 
2002-2006 
Change in total debt to income 
2002-2006 
        
Instrumented  house  price  growth,  2002-2006  0.940** 0.899** 0.902** 4.177** 3.167** 2.360** 
  (0.305) (0.262) (0.241) (1.107) (0.833) (0.706) 
        
Fraction in zip code with credit score under 660, 1997  -0.256**  -0.047  0.054  0.262  0.619*  1.162** 
  (0.084) (0.081) (0.108) (0.274) (0.243) (0.317) 
Median  home  value,  2002   -0.000     -0.001**   
   (0.000)    (0.000)  
(Credit  score,  1997)/100   -0.046**    -0.145**  
   (0.010)    (0.022)  
Ln(household  income,  2008)   0.170**    0.527**  
   (0.026)    (0.048)  
Age,  1997   -0.009**    -0.027**  
   (0.001)    (0.002)  
Male dummy variable    0.013  0.015    0.135*  0.134* 
   (0.025)  (0.022)  (0.057)  (0.052) 
Additional control variables      Individual 
dummy 
variables 
   Individual 
dummy 
variables 
N  12161 12137 12137 12160 12137 12137 
R
2  0.01 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.10 0.12 
**,*, +  coefficient statistically distinct from 0 at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  Table VII 
What Do Homeowners Do with Borrowed Money? 
Panel A examines whether households in high house price growth areas are more likely to move to a new zip code 
and whether movers and non-movers experience differential growth rates in debt from 2002 to 2006. Panel B 
examines whether households in high house price growth areas are more likely to increase their number of 
mortgages, which is a proxy for the purchase of an investment property. Panel C isolates the sample to individuals in 
the top quartile of the 1997 credit card utilization distribution and examines whether households in high house price 
appreciation areas are more likely to pay down credit card balances. All specifications include control variables for 
individual 1997 credit score, 2008 income, age, and sex. Standard errors are clustered at the MSA level. 
Panel A: Purchase of new homes? 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sample   MSA  averages  Full  Movers  Non-movers 




Total debt growth 
2002-2006 
HP Growth, 2002-2006    0.030       
   (0.035)       
Instrumented HP Growth, 2002-2006      -0.092  0.674**  0.578** 
     (0.101)  (0.171)  (0.146) 
N   45  12143  6167  5976 
R
2    0.34 0.01 0.00 0.01 
        
        
Panel B: Purchase of investment properties?
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sample    Full  Full  Full  No change in  
# of mortgages 
Left hand side variable    Change in # of mortgages 
2001-2005 
Total debt growth 
2002-2006 
HP Growth, 2002-2006    -0.039+       
   (0.023)       
Instrumented HP Growth, 2002-2006      -0.182**  0.652**  0.597** 
     (0.048)  (0.123)  (0.177) 
Change in # of mortgages, 2001-2005        0.628**   
       (0.033)   
N   11893  11893  11893  3569 
R
2    0.02 0.01 0.10 0.02 
        
        
Panel C: Paying down credit card balances?
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sample    Top quartile credit card utilization as of 1997 















Instrumented HP Growth, 2002-2006    0.801**  0.147  2.146**  0.026 
    (0.153) (0.169) (0.417) (0.025) 
N   3031  3031  3031  3031 
R
2    0.02 0.00 0.04 0.01 
**,*, +  coefficient statistically distinct from 0 at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 Table VIII 
Cross-Sectional Heterogeneity in Effect of House Prices on Household Borrowing for 1997 Homeowners 
This table presents estimates of the cross-sectional heterogeneity of the effect of house prices on household borrowing for individuals that have either positive 
outstanding mortgage debt as of 1997 or a previous mortgage account. In each column, we interact house price growth with the variable in the top of the column. 
The instruments in the first stage are MSA level housing supply elasticity and MSA level housing supply elasticity interacted with the interaction variable listed 
in the top of the column. In all columns, we use the data sorts that maximize variation in the interaction variable. More specifically, in columns 1 and 2 we use  
data sorted by credit score before groups are formed. In columns 3 to 6, we use data sorted by each interaction variable before groups are formed. All standard 
errors are clustered at the MSA level. 
        
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 







Age, 1997  Age>=65, 1997  Male 
Left hand side variable  Total debt growth 
2002-2006 
Instrumented house price growth, 2002-2006  2.576**  0.292*  1.053+  1.253**  0.702**  0.609** 
  (0.479) (0.124) (0.563) (0.413) (0.147) (0.138) 
        
Instrumented house price growth, 2002-2006  -0.255**  0.952**  -0.100  -0.011    0.089 
*Interaction term (listed at top of column)  (0.055) (0.226) (0.114) (0.007)    (0.143) 
Age>=65  indicator       -0.358+   
       (0.186)   
Instrumented house price growth, 2002-2006          0.156   
*Age>=65       (0.096)   
        
(Credit score, 1997)/100  0.055+  -0.065**  -0.047 -0.032 -0.031  -0.089** 
  (0.033) (0.022) (0.036) (0.034) (0.033) (0.028) 
Credit cart utilization, 1997  -0.158*  -0.609** -0.092  0.023  0.027 -0.205** 
  (0.064) (0.094) (0.061) (0.050) (0.048) (0.067) 
Ln(household  income,  2008)  0.149** 0.151** 0.251** 0.165** 0.162** 0.156** 
  (0.022) (0.022) (0.058) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) 
Age,  1997  -0.010** -0.010** -0.012** -0.009** -0.014** -0.010** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
Male  dummy  variable  0.023  0.024 -0.016 -0.021 -0.022 -0.036 
  0.055+  -0.065**  -0.047 -0.032 -0.031  -0.089** 
N  12145 12145 11576 11844 11844 10742 
R
2  0.01 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.01 
**,*, +  coefficient statistically distinct from 0 at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
  Table IX 
The Effect of House Prices on Default Rates from 2002-2006 for 1997 Homeowners 
This table presents the effect of house price growth on default rates from 2002 to 2006. In columns 3 to 6, we interact house price growth with the variable in the 
top of the column. The instruments in the first stage are MSA level housing supply elasticity and MSA level housing supply elasticity interacted with the 
interaction variable listed in the top of the column. In all columns, we use the data sorts that maximize variation in the interaction variable. More specifically, in 
columns 3 and 4 we use the data sorted by credit score before groups are formed. In columns 5 to 7, we use the data sorted by each interaction variable before 
groups are formed. All standard errors are clustered at the MSA level.
         
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 








Age, 1997  Male 
Left hand side variable 
 
Change in default rate, 2002-2006 
Instrumented house price growth, 2002-2006  -0.029** -0.039** -0.300**  -0.002  0.093  -0.064  -0.033* 
  (0.009) (0.008) (0.094) (0.015) (0.100) (0.058) (0.016) 
         
Instrumented house price growth, 2002-2006      0.034**  -0.106*  -0.029  0.001  0.025 
*Interaction term (listed at top of column)      (0.012) (0.045) (0.022) (0.001) (0.026) 
         
(Credit  score,  1997)/100    0.010** -0.005 0.011** 0.008+ 0.005+ 0.006+ 
    (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Ln(household  income,  2008)    0.003 0.003 0.003 0.015 0.001 -0.000 
    (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.011) (0.003) (0.003) 
Age,  1997    0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Male dummy variable    0.006  0.006  0.006  0.013+  0.008  -0.007 
    (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.012) 
Credit card utilization, 1997      0.005  0.054*  -0.012  -0.022*  -0.004 
      (0.010) (0.024) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
N  12158 12144 12143 12143 11549 11836 10736 
R
2  0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 
**,*, +  coefficient statistically distinct from 0 at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  Table X 
The Effect of House Prices from 2002-2006 on Default Rates from 2006-2008 for 1997 Homeowners 
This table presents the effect of house price growth from 2002 to 2006 on default rates from 2006 to 2008. In columns 3 to 6, we interact house price growth with 
the variable in the top of the column. The instruments in the first stage are MSA level housing supply elasticity and MSA level housing supply elasticity 
interacted with the interaction variable listed in the top of the column. In all columns, we use the data sorts that maximize variation in the interaction variable. 
More specifically, in columns 3 and 4 we use the data sorted by credit score before groups are formed. In columns 5 to 7, we use the data sorted by each 
interaction variable before groups are formed. All standard errors are clustered at the MSA level. 
         
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 








Age, 1997  Male 
Left hand side variable 
 
Change in default rate, 2006-2008 
Instrumented house price growth, 2002-2006  0.093**  0.116**  0.685**  0.026  0.057  0.250**  0.110** 
  (0.017) (0.020) (0.162) (0.017) (0.090) (0.081) (0.026) 
         
Instrumented house price growth, 2002-2006      -0.075**  0.251**  0.011  -0.002+  -0.006 
*Interaction term (listed at top of column)      (0.019) (0.065) (0.022) (0.001) (0.035) 
         
(Credit score, 1997)/100    -0.024**  0.016+  -0.019** -0.019** -0.018** -0.022** 
    (0.002) (0.009) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Ln(household income, 2008)    -0.005  -0.006 -0.006 -0.010  -0.012*  -0.010* 
    (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.012) (0.005) (0.005) 
Age, 1997    -0.001**  -0.001**  -0.001** -0.001*  0.000  -0.001** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Male dummy variable    -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  0.005  0.014*  0.002 
    (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.017) 
Credit card utilization, 1997      0.022  -0.097**  0.012  0.022+  0.017 
      (0.014) (0.030) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) 
N  12153 12140 12139 12139 11536 11832 10731 
R
2  0.02 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.03 




Aggregate U.S. Leverage and House Price Patterns  
This figure presents aggregate U.S. leverage and house price patterns. Aggregate debt information come from the 
Federal Reserve flow of funds data, aggregate income comes from NIPA, and aggregate house price index data 
come from OFHEO. In the bottom right panel, aggregate debt for 1997 homeowners comes from Equifax data where 
homeowners are defined to be individuals who have either an existing mortgage account with positive balance as of 
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U.S. Household Debt for 1997 Homeowners and House PricesFigure 2 
House Price and Leverage Patterns, Inelastic versus Elastic Housing Supply MSAs 
This figure presents house price, total debt, and total debt to income patterns for the top and bottom quartile MSAs 
based on housing supply elasticity from Saiz (2008). The sample includes individuals with mortgage debt 
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Change in debt to income ratio, relative to 2001Figure 3 
The Effect of House Prices on Total Debt Growth for 1997 Homeowners 
This figure presents the effect of house price growth on total debt growth from 2002 to 2006 across the full 
distribution. The first stage instrument is the MSA-level housing supply elasticity from Saiz (2008). The sample 
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Predicted house price change 2002-2006Figure 4 
House Price and Leverage Patterns for  
Homeowners Living in High Subprime Share Zip Codes in Inelastic Housing Supply MSAs 
This figure plots the coefficient estimates for 
t for the following specification for each year t: 
          ,                             ,                             ,                         ,                  
where y is the natural logarithm of house prices in the top graph, the natural logarithm of total debt in the middle 
graph, and the debt to income ratio in the bottom graph. The graphs show differential patterns for homeowners 
living in high subprime share zip codes in inelastic housing supply MSAs relative to both homeowners living in low 





















































































1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Year





















































































1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Year
























































































1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Year
(Change relative to 1998)
Change in total debt to income ratioFigure 5 
Cross-Sectional Heterogeneity in Leverage Patterns for 1997 Homeowners 
By Housing Supply Elasticity 
This figure presents household leverage patterns for the highest and lowest quartile of housing supply elasticity 
MSAs, by the credit quality of borrowers as of 1997 (top two panels), the credit card utilization rate of borrowers as 
of 1997 (middle two panels), and the age of borrowers (bottom two panels). The sample includes individuals with 






























1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Year
Inelastic MSAs Elastic MSAs






























1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Year
Inelastic MSAs Elastic MSAs






























1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Year
Inelastic MSAs Elastic MSAs






























1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Year
Inelastic MSAs Elastic MSAs






























1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Year
Inelastic MSAs Elastic MSAs





























1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Year
Inelastic MSAs Elastic MSAs
Debt growth, Old homeownersFigure 6 
Default Patterns for Homeowners, By Housing Supply Elasticity and 1997 Credit Quality 
This figure presents default patterns for the highest and lowest quartile of housing supply elasticity MSAs, by the 
credit quality of borrowers as of 1997. The top graph examines the full sample. The middle graph examines 
borrowers in the lowest quartile of the 1997 credit score distribution, and the bottom graph examines borrowers in 
the highest quartile of the 1997 credit score distribution. The sample includes individuals with mortgage debt 
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High Credit Quality 1997 HomeownersFigure 7 
Cross-Sectional Heterogeneity in Auto Debt Growth for 1997 Homeowners 
By Housing Supply Elasticity 
This figure presents household auto debt growth patterns for the highest and lowest quartile of housing supply 
elasticity MSAs, by the credit quality of borrowers as of 1997 (top panels) and the credit card utilization rate of 
borrowers as of 1997 (bottom panel). The sample includes individuals with mortgage debt outstanding as of 1997 or 
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1997 Low Credit Card Utilization HomeownersAppendix Table 1 
Summary Statistics for Renters 
This table presents summary statistics for individuals who have no current or previous mortgage debt outstanding. 
Individuals are sorted into groups of at least 5 individuals. Each group consists of individuals living in the same zip 
code as of 1997, and the individuals are sorted by 1997 credit score before groups are formed. The income in the 
denominator of the debt to income ratio comes from zip level IRS data. The zip code level median home value as of 
2002 comes from the 2000 value reported in the decennial Census multiplied by the growth rate from 2000 to 2002 
reported in the Fiserv Case Shiller Weiss data. The housing supply inelasticity measure we use is three – the Saiz 
(2008) measure. The Saiz (2008) measure is increasing in elasticity from 0 to 3. There are 2,075 zip codes and 45 
MSAs that are represented in the sample. 
      
 N  Mean  Median  St.  Dev. 
Equifax individual level data      
Total debt, 1997, $thousands  20369  6  4  5 
Home debt, 1997, $thousands  20369  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Growth in total debt, 1998-2002  20254  0.918  0.821  1.232 
Growth in total debt, 2002-2006  20116  0.638  0.498  1.300 
Growth in home debt, 1998-2002  20254  1.312  0.000  1.897 
Growth in home debt, 2002-2006  20116  0.906  0.264  1.956 
Total debt to income ratio, 1997  19541  0.168  0.126  0.161 
Change in debt to income ratio, 1998-2002  20192  0.514  0.210  0.735 
Change in debt to income ratio, 2002-2006  20099  0.796  0.248  1.336 
Total debt default rate, 1997  20323  0.138  0.000  0.270 
Change in default rate, 1998-2006  19609  -0.040  0.000  0.287 
Change in default rate, 2006-2008  19336  0.046  0.000  0.273 
Credit score, 1997  20369  705  704  103 
Credit card utilization fraction, 1997  20337  0.471  0.451  0.343 
Age,  1997  20157  53 50 14 
Male  19237 0.482 0.500 0.343 
Income,  1997,  $thousands  20047  59 54 32 
      
Fiserv Case Shiller Weiss zip level data      
House price growth, zip level, 1998-2002  20275  0.410  0.433  0.142 
House price growth, zip level, 2002-2006  20369  0.497  0.497  0.233 
      
Saiz (2008) MSA level elasticity measure      
Housing  supply  inelasticity  20369 2.015 2.140 0.463 
      
Median home value, 2002, $thousands  20252  220  190  133 
      
IRS zip level  income data      
Per capita wage growth, 2002-2006  20351  0.117  0.111  0.062 
      
 Census business statistics zip level data      
Per capita payroll growth, 2002-2006  19763  0.120  0.120  0.122 
Employment  growth,  2002-2006  19763 0.067 0.055 0.188 
      
Equifax zip level aggregate data      
Fraction of zip code  
with credit score under 659, 1997 
20332 0.336 0.322 0.127 
 
  Appendix Table 2 
Summary Statistics for Moving Homeowners 
This table presents summary statistics for individuals who have either an existing mortgage account with positive 
balance as of 1997 or a previous mortgage account, and move zip codes between 1997 and 1999. Individuals are 
sorted into groups of at least 5 individuals. Each group consists of individuals living in the same zip code as of 1997, 
and the individuals are sorted by 1997 credit score before groups are formed. The income in the denominator of the 
debt to income ratio comes from zip level IRS data. The zip code level median home value as of 2002 comes from 
the 2000 value reported in the decennial Census multiplied by the growth rate from 2000 to 2002 reported in the 
Fiserv Case Shiller Weiss data. The housing supply inelasticity measure we use is three – the Saiz (2008) measure. 
The Saiz (2008) measure is increasing in elasticity from 0 to 3. There are 3,016 zip codes and 83 MSAs that are 
represented in the sample. 
      
 N  Mean  Median  St.  Dev. 
Equifax individual level data      
Total debt, 1997, $thousands  2270  121  115  79 
Home debt, 1997, $thousands  2270  105  100  77 
Growth in total debt, 1998-2002  2270  0.156  0.142  0.592 
Growth in total debt, 2002-2006  2270  0.419  0.407  0.625 
Growth in home debt, 1998-2002  2270  0.156  0.134  0.837 
Growth in home debt, 2002-2006  2270  0.478  0.448  0.846 
Total debt to income ratio, 1997  2134  2.983  2.909  1.632 
Change in debt to income ratio, 1998-2002  2205  0.182  0.090  1.071 
Change in debt to income ratio, 2002-2006  2253  1.124  0.820  1.562 
Total debt default rate, 1997  2270  0.055  0.000  0.119 
Change in default rate, 1998-2006  2270  -0.013  0.000  0.135 
Change in default rate, 2006-2008  2270  0.053  0.000  0.174 
Credit score, 1997  2270  762  765  79 
Credit card utilization fraction, 1997  2269  0.352  0.310  0.216 
Age, 1997  2270  54  54  6 
Male  2270 0.563 0.571 0.242 
Income,  1997,  $thousands  2270  87 83 32 
      
Fiserv Case Shiller Weiss zip level data      
House price growth, zip level, 1998-2002  2265  0.387  0.404  0.138 
House price growth, zip level, 2002-2006  2270  0.498  0.505  0.225 
      
Saiz (2008) MSA level elasticity measure      
Housing  supply  inelasticity  2270 1.986 2.080 0.461 
      
Median home value, 2002, $thousands  2166  225  191  132 
      
IRS zip level  income data      
Per capita wage growth, 2002-2006  2253  0.114  0.108  0.067 
      
 Census business statistics zip level data      
Per capita payroll growth, 2002-2006  2169  0.124  0.123  0.126 
Employment  growth,  2002-2006  2169 0.119 0.091 0.230 
      
Equifax zip level aggregate data      
Fraction of zip code  
with credit score under 659, 1997 
2223 0.321 0.306 0.132 
 
  Appendix Table 3 
Sample MSAs and Inelasticity Scores 




MSA name  Inelasticity   
      
1. Miami-Miami  Beach-Kendall,  FL    2.430   
2.  Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale, CA   2.430   
3.  San Francisco-San Mateo-Redwood City, CA   2.410   
4.  New York-White Plains-Wayne, NY-NJ   2.360   
5. Boston-Quincy,  MA    2.350   
6.  Oakland-Fremont-Hayward, CA   2.340   
7.  San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos CA  2.320   
8.  Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach-Deerfield Beach, FL   2.290   
9. Chicago-Naperville-Joliet,  IL    2.270   
10.  San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara CA  2.250   
11.  Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA   2.220   
12.  New Haven-Milford CT  2.140   
13. Baltimore-Towson  MD  2.140   
14. Riverside-San  Bernardino-Ontario  CA  2.080   
15. Newark-Union,  NJ-PA    2.080   
16.  Providence-New Bedford-Fall River RI-MA  2.030   
17.  West Palm Beach-Boca Raton-Boynton Beach, FL   2.010   
18. Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton  OR-WA  1.990   
19. Tampa-St.  Petersburg-Clearwater  FL  1.970   
20. Detroit-Livonia-Dearborn,  MI    1.960   
21. Vallejo-Fairfield  CA  1.940   
22. Jacksonville  FL  1.940   
23. Philadelphia,  PA    1.900   
24. Orlando-Kissimmee,  FL  1.850   
25. Memphis  TN-MS-AR  1.830   
26.  Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington MN-WI  1.820   
27. Denver-Aurora  CO  1.820   
28.  Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford CT  1.810   
29.  Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV   1.720   
30. Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale  AZ  1.710   
31. Fresno  CA  1.690   
32. Bakersfield  CA  1.660   
33. Raleigh-Cary  NC  1.500   
34. Stockton  CA  1.470   
35. Ann  Arbor  MI  1.300   
36. Las  Vegas-Paradise  NV  1.180   
37. Columbus  OH  1.120   
38. Akron  OH  1.100   
39. Toledo  OH  1.070   
40. Atlanta-Sandy  Springs-Marietta  GA  1.060   
41. Youngstown-Warren-Boardman  OH-PA  0.880   
42. Cincinnati-Middletown  OH-KY-IN  0.850   
43. Greensboro-High  Point  NC  0.610   
44. Charlotte-Gastonia-Concord  NC-SC  0.410   
45. Toledo,  OH  0.090   
 